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DOES HIGHER TAX MORALE IMPLY
HIGHER OPTIMAL LABOR INCOME TAX RATE?
Andra´s Simonovits1
Abstract
We analyze the impact of tax morale on optimal progressive labor income taxation. Only
universal basic income is financed from a linear tax and the financing of public goods is
neglected. Each individual supplies labor and (un)declares earning, depending on his labor
disutility and tax morale. Limiting the utilitarianism to the poorer parts of the population
(defined by the inclusion share), the optimal tax rate is an increasing function of the tax
morale and a decreasing function of the inclusion share, provided that the average wage
of those included is higher than 0.54 times the average wage.
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I. Introduction
Between 1930 and 1970, the ratio of government tax and social security revenues to GDP
rose sharply and has remained at a high level since the 1970s in the developed world. It is
a commonplace that rising labor income (and other) tax rates may diminish labor supply
and increase tax evasion, therefore relative labor supply and tax evasion may have been in-
creasing. But comparing different countries, it becomes evident that the impact of taxation
on economic activity also depends on so-called “tax morale” (or morality). This concept
refers to the propensity to pay taxes or captures “the readiness with which individuals
leave the official economy and enter the illegitimate (untaxed) hidden economy” (Frey
andWeck-Hannemann, 1984; see also Lago-Penas and Lago-Penas (2010) for its determi-
nants). We should distinguish between exogenous and endogenous individual tax morales:
the former is a given parameter of the utility function, the latter depends on the exogenous
tax morale as well as on the observed behavior of the individual’s neighborhood.
1 Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budao¨rsi u´t. 45, 1112 Budapest, Hungary. E-mail:
simonov@econ.core.hu.
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In the present paper, we analyze the impact of the exogenous tax morale on the tax rate in
a very simple static model, where a flat-rate labor income tax finances a universal basic
income (transfer), neglecting the fiscal demand of providing public goods. Every individual
chooses his labor supply and reports his earnings to maximize his utility, depending on
his consumption, labor- and moral disutility. In this model, the existence of tax morale
makes monitoring and punishing tax evasion superfluous. In the traditional approach, the
government takes the tax revenue as given and then the usual wisdom prevails: the higher
the tax morale, the lower the (lower) balancing tax rate.
In contrast, we consider a government maximizing social welfare (cf. Cowell and Gordon,
1988). Following earlier trials (Simonovits, 2010 and 2011), we create a model and answer
our title question in the affirmative: higher tax morale implies higher optimal flat tax rate
under a qualification soon to be explained.
If one works with the usual, strictly concave utility functions (even avoiding design
problems), then the calculations soon become excessively complex. One makes a lot
of assumptions on the underlying utility functions, and even then often must rely on
numerical illustrations with parametric functions. However, we adopt the linear-quadratic
utility function of Doerrenberg et al. (2012), yielding simple linear decision functions.
The optimal labor supply is a linear function of the tax rate (with a negative coefficient,
whose absolute value increases in the tax morale) and the optimal share of undeclared
earning is equal to the inverse tax morale.2
But the linearity of the consumption utility makes income redistribution superfluous under
a purely utilitarian social welfare function and therefore we must introduce generalized
utilitarian social welfare functions. To preserve analytical simplicity, we define a truncated
(or generalized Rawlsian) social welfare function as the average of the first J lowest
utilities out of I utilities, J < I , J being the cutoff index, and ν = J/I being the inclusion
share. It is obvious that the lower the J (or equivalently, ν), the more progressive the
social welfare function. For any truncated or exclusive social welfare function, we were
able to determine explicitly the socially optimal tax rate and show that it is a relatively
simple increasing function of the tax morale and a decreasing function of the inclusion
share (Theorems 2 and 3), provided that the average wage of those included is higher
than 0.54 times the average wage. (Note, however, that if the pre-tax wage rates of certain
types are too low, fixed costs prevent these types from working at all.) In an earlier
model (Simonovits, 2011), we have also investigated numerically this dependence for
inclusive CRRA social welfare functions, and we invariably received qualitatively the
same schedule.3
In this framework, the intuition behind themajor result appears to be relatively simple. The
government’s objective is to maximize a progressive social welfare function. Recall that
raising the tax rate initially increases the transfer received by the poorest but diminishes
the labor supply and thus the total output. For any realistically given tax rate, the higher
2 In Simonovits (2011), under a simpler although less appropriate assumption, the optimal undeclared earning
was equal to the ratio of the wage rate to the tax morale, yielding an unconditionally affirmative answer.
3 This confirms Ravaillon’s (1997, p. 359) observation: “the theoretical distinction [between exclusive and
inclusive social welfare functions, A.S.] can sometimes be of very little practical consequence”.
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the tax morale, the lower the optimal undeclared earning, making taxing less costly. Due to
the specification of the model, however, for any given positive tax rate, the optimal labor
supply is also a diminishing function of the tax morale! Therefore our intuitive argument is
not watertight and we need to give the conditions under which the statement holds, namely
that the average wage of the included population with respect to the total average wage
is high enough. Our general (nonparametric) model highlights the complexities arising in
the proof of our conjecture.4
Despite the artificial specification of the utility functions and the exclusion of consumption
and social security taxes, Doerrenberg et al. (2012) report empirical verification. To relate
our highly theoretical observation to the real world, a very stylized table is presented,
describing various combinations of tax morales (lower and higher) and tax shares (low,
medium, high), with the latter defined as the ratio of tax (and pension) revenues to GDP.5
The tax morale can be approximated by the corruption index (10 minus the traditional
one). We tentatively interpret Table 1 as showing that a medium tax share may be socially
optimal for a country with lower tax morale (e.g. the Czech Republic versus Slovakia
or Hungary with an approximately common corruption index value 5), while a high tax
share may be optimal for a country with higher tax morale (like Sweden versus the US or
Germany with corruption index values below 2.5).
Table 1: Tax shares, tax morales and ranking of social welfare
Tax share Low Medium High
cc. 30% cc. 40% cc. 50%
Lower morale Slovakia < Czech Rep. > Hungary
Higher morale USA < Germany < Sweden
At this stage, a short review of the literature is given. In his pioneering paper, Mirrlees
(1971) solved the theoretical problem of designing socially optimal labor income taxation,
when labor supply is flexible but productivity is private information. Sheshinski (1972)
simplified the analysis by confining his attention to linear taxes (cf. Feldstein, 1973). One
limitation of these papers is that they did not consider tax evasion. Taking the opposite
extreme position, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) analyzed income tax evasion, neglecting
the flexibility of labor supply. In a sequel to that paper, Sandmo (1981) extended the
research on tax evasion into the direction of social welfare maximization with flexible
labor supply and raised a weaker form of the basic result of the present paper (p. 279):
“a natural question to ask is whether . . . the marginal tax rate in some sense ought to be
lower than otherwise have been because of the presence of tax evasion.”6
4 It is to be hoped that the results remain valid in more general settings (cf. Simonovits (2010) with strictly
concave utility functions and public expenditures).
5 The tax share index – somewhat unreliable but still characteristic – refers to the pre-crisis era and contains
many things directly not related to our problem (budget deficits, interest payments, different public pension
systems, etc.).
6 Later on (p. 282) he gave alternative sufficient conditions, namely either “regular income is now a less reliable
indicator of economic welfare” or “the numerical value of the compensated supply derivative in the regular
market is increased” but did not commit himself to their validity. Cremer and Gavhari (1996) were also agnostic
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In their survey, Andreoni et al. (1998) extended the narrow neoclassical model and intro-
duced soft but relevant concepts like moral sentiments and the satisfaction of the taxpayer
with the provision of public goods and services. From our point of view, they made three
important observations: (i) the morally more sensitive citizens declare a higher share of
their true (pre-tax) incomes; (ii) the more unfair the tax-and-transfer system is in the eyes
of citizens, the less income they declare; (iii) the less satisfied the taxpayers are with the
provision of public goods and services, the less income they declare.7
Traxler (2010) extended the analysis from exogenous to endogenous tax morale, where
the individual tax morale depends on the observed degree of tax evasion. Combining the
two approaches, Garay, Simonovits and To´th (2012) and Me´der, Simonovits and Vincze
(2012) investigated the dynamics of the tax evasion process. Using the framework of
Simonovits (2010), both papers neglected income redistribution and studied the dynamics
of the declared (or taxable) incomes underlying financing the provision of public goods,
just the opposite of the present paper’s approach.
In the paper already mentioned, Doerrenberg et al. (2012) considered differentiated ta-
xation among different groups in different countries. Using econometric techniques, they
found that typically in any country, “nice guys finish last: people with higher tax morale
are taxed more heavily”.8
Romer (1975) also obtained interesting results concerning the impact of majority voting
on linear income taxes – an alternative to welfare analysis. In such a political economy
framework, Meltzer and Richard (1981) proved an interesting intuitively appealing result:
the greater the pre-tax income inequality, the greater redistribution will be chosen by the
median voter. (By the way, Theorem 2* of the present paper reproduces this result, also
preserving the influence of tax morale.)
Comparing two countries, say the US and Sweden, an apparent anomaly can be found
(e.g. Alesina and Angelitos, 2005). Although the US inequality of the pre-tax incomes is
greater than the Swedish, the US personal income tax is less progressive than the Swedish.
The foregoing authors created a model with country-specific beliefs on the role of luck in
the determination of individual pre-tax earnings. Their major result was as follows: the
stronger the presumed role of luck, the greater income redistribution is selected by the
median voter. In contrast, in our social welfare maximization framework, this anomaly can
be explained by the difference between the countries’ social welfare functions: the impact
of the lower inclusion share overrules the impact of the lower pre-tax income inequality,
implying a higher optimal tax rate.
about the impact of tax evasion on the optimal tax rate (see also Sandmo, 2012, pp. 20–21).
7 From Feldstein (1999) to Chetty (2009) and Saez et al. (2009), a great number of papers studied tax avoidance
and the deadweight loss due to the income tax in a more direct way. These papers put the concept of elasticity
of taxable income to the center of the analysis, eliminating any distinction between restrained labor supply and
underreported earnings.
8 Making the individual utilities dependent on others’ utilities, Doerrenberg and Peichl (2013) discussed the
opposite causality and found that greater tax progressivity implies higher tax morale.
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The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the model
and Section 3 displays the illustrations. Section 4 concludes. An Appendix contains the
proofs.
II. The model
First, we shall sketch the general framework, then we parameterize it to obtain explicit
formulas and definite results.
General framework
There are I(> 1) types in the population, indexed as i = 1, . . . , I . Type i’s labor supply
is li, 0 < li ≤ 1, his pre-tax wage rate (independently of the tax system) is wi > 0, both
reals, thus his earning is wili. To achieve income redistribution, the government collects
a linear tax with a flat (marginal) tax rate τ , 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1 and transfers a basic income β ≥ 0.
Type i undeclares ei ≥ 0 from his earning, i.e. he evades tax τei, therefore his declared
(or taxable) earning is yi = wili−ei and his net tax is equal to τyi−β = τ(wili−ei)−β.
Consequently, his consumption is given by ci = (1 − τ)wili + τei + β. Note that for
any positive basic income β > 0, even the flat-rate tax is progressive in the sense that the
average net tax rate ti = (τyi−β)/yi is increasing in the declared earning yi. To derive the
dual choice of labor supply and undeclared earning from individual utility maximization,
we must assume individual objective functions.
First, we use a general utility function ui(ci, li, ei). Of course, the value of the basic
income β as well as of the consumption ci depends on the decisions of all the workers
(see below). Since the impact of any single worker on β can be neglected, our workers
neglect it. Therefore type i maximizes the reduced utility function vi(li, ei) = ui((1 −
τ)wili+τei+β, li, ei) without explicitly considering the basic income. Taking the partial
derivatives of this concave function with respect to li and ei and equating them to zero,
his optimal decisions are respectively l∗i and e
∗
i , satisfying the conditions
v′i,l(li, ei) = u
′
i,c(ci, li, ei)(1− τ)wi + u′i,l(ci, li, ei) = 0
and
v′i,e(li, ei) = u
′
i,c(ci, li, ei)τ + u
′
i,e(ci, li, ei) = 0,
where the partial derivatives have the usual signs:
u′i,c > 0 > u
′
i,l, u
′
i,e.
Let fi denote the frequency of type i in the population, fi > 0 and
∑I
i=1 fi = 1. Then
the expected output is Z∗ =
∑I
i=1 fiw
∗
i l
∗
i and the expected evasion is E
∗ =
∑I
i=1 fie
∗
i .
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the total (or average) net tax is zero (neglecting
the provision of public goods), i.e. we end up with the following budget constraint taken
at the individual optima: β∗ = τ(Z∗ − E∗).
At this point we introduce our main concept, the exogenous tax morale µ. It is a parameter,
represented by a real number. We assume that the individual i’s utility function depends on
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µ in the following way: in addition to ci, li and ei, ui(·, ·, ·, µ) as well as vi(·, ·, µ) depends
also on µ. Assuming the usual smoothness conditions, and taking the partial derivatives
with respect to the tax morale µ, yields the usual equations:
v′′i,lll
∗′ + v′′i,lee
∗′ + v′′i,lµ = 0 and v
′′
i,ell
∗′ + v′′i,eee
∗′ + v′′i,eµ = 0.
To have a meaningful model, we must ensure that the share of the unreported income in
the true income, e∗i (µ)/[wil
∗
i (µ)] is an increasing function.
Let ψ be a concave and weakly increasing function of v∗i s. Then we can introduce a social
welfare function V (µ, τ) =
∑I
i=1 fiψ(v
∗
i (µ, τ)) and we can formulate our major if
somewhat empty claim.
Theorem 0. Let us assume that V (µ, τ) satisfies the usual smoothness and concavity
conditions, moreover, conditions V ′′ττ < 0 < V
′′
τµ also hold. Then the welfare maximizing
tax rate τ(µ) is an increasing function of the tax morale µ and
τ ′(µ) = −V
′′
τµ
V ′′ττ
> 0.
Proof. Taking the total derivative of the social optimality condition V ′τ (µ, τ) = 0 with
respect to µ yields V ′′τµ + V
′′
τττ
′(µ) = 0.
The more concave ψ is, the more progressive is the social welfare function, probably
yielding a higher socially optimal tax rate.
We have made a lot of assumptions which are hard to check. We shall now turn to a para-
meterized model where every ad hoc assumption can be derived. We shall see, however,
that the negative impact of the tax morale on the labor supply can be so strong that the
optimal tax rate is a decreasing function for high enough morales.
Parameterized model
FollowingDoerrenberg et al. (2012), we shall rely on linear–quadratic utility functions and
obtain explicit formulas. In addition to a usual linear consumption utility 2ci and a quadratic
labor disutility function −αwil2i , (α > 0 being the coefficient of labor disutility), we
introduce a quadraticmoral disutility function of tax evasion−µτwili[ei/(wili)]2, (µ > 0
being the coefficient of tax morale, for short, the tax morale).9 In sum, type i’s utility
function is
ui = 2ci − αwil2i − µτw−1i l−1i e2i .
Inserting formula for ci into formula for ui, we receive a reduced utility function
vi(li, ei) = 2(1− τ)wili + 2τei + 2β − αwil2i − µτw−1i l−1i e2i .
9 We shall see that factor τwili equalizes the optimal share of undeclared earning to the inverse tax morale and
factor wi makes the optimal labor supply independent of the type-specific wage. Note that we imitate Yitzaki
(1974), who made the penalty proportional to the evaded tax rather than the undeclared earning. Finally, by
doubling the consumption in the utility function, the occurrence of fractions is minimized. Replacing labor
disutility by αwi(li − T )2 would enhance labor supply.
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Neglecting β, and introducing notation δ = 1 − µ−1/2 < 1, we obtain the individual
optimum (see the Appendix):
l∗i = α
−1(1− δτ) = λ and e∗i = µ−1wil∗i .
Note the simple meaning of these rules: the uniform optimal labor supply l∗i = λ is
a diminishing linear function of τ , where the proportionality coefficient is the reciprocal
of α and the coefficient of τ is −δ (reflecting that the effective tax rate is increasing with
morality); the optimal undeclared earning e∗i is proportional to the wage earned wil
∗
i ,
where the proportionality coefficient is the reciprocal of µ. In a white economy (studied
by Mirrlees), µ =∞, δ = 1, li = α−1(1− τ) and e∗i = 0.
To obtain a feasible labor supply for any tax rate, it is appropriate to assume α ≥ 1, in the
limit: α = 1. It is also logical to assume, that at the optimum, the undeclared earning is
less than the true earning, i.e. µ > 1. We can make the following observation: the reported
earning
y∗i = wil
∗
i − e∗i = (1− µ−1)λwi
is an increasing function of the tax morale and a decreasing function of the tax rate if
τ < 2/3, which is an innocent restriction.
Turning from individual to aggregate behavior, without loss of generality, we assume that
the weight of type i in the population is uniform, i.e. fi = 1/I . We shall need the average
wage rate to be normalized to unity:
W =
1
I
I∑
i=1
wi = 1.
Three more averages are introduced: average labor supply, average earning and average
undeclared earning, respectively:
L =
1
I
I∑
i=1
li, Z =
1
I
I∑
i=1
wili and E =
1
I
I∑
i=1
ei.
At the optimum, they are equal to L∗ = λ = Z∗ and E∗ = µ−1λ, respectively.
Now the budget constrains gives the basic income:
β∗ = τ(1− µ−1)λ.
The government of a traditional economist takes the tax revenue β∗ as given and looks
for a balancing tax rate τ . We make the usual assumption that the fixed tax revenue is
feasible: 0 < β < β¯ and the chosen balancing tax rate is to the left rather than to the right
from the maximizing one: 0 < τ < τ¯ (see the literature on the Laffer-curve) and prove
the traditional view.
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Theorem 1. Suppose that the basic income β∗ is not too high:
0 < β∗ < β¯ =
1− µ−1
4δ(µ)α
.
Then there are two balancing tax rates and the lower is given by
τβ∗ [µ] =
1−√1− 4δβ∗α/(1− µ−1)
2δ(µ)
< τ¯ =
1
2δ(µ)
.
Moreover, the balancing tax rate is a decreasing function of the tax morale.
Remark. Due to the assumed homogeneity of the disutility parameters, this result is
independent of the wage rate distribution.
Social welfare
Wemove now to the main field of interest, namely to social welfare maximization. To find
the socially optimal tax rate and the corresponding basic income, it is worth expressing
the optimal reduced utilities as indirect utility functions (see Appendix):
u∗i = vi(l
∗
i , e
∗
i ) = 2λwi(1− τ) + µ−1wiλτ + 2τ(1− µ−1)λ− αwiλ2.
Note that, contrary to Simonovits (2010), we cannot use a purely utilitarian social welfare
function, because the individual utility is a linear function of the individual consumption
– making any income redistribution not only useless but counterproductive. Rather we
look for a family of generalized social welfare functions which preserve the simplicity of
the purely utilitarian one but do not exclude redistribution. We shall introduce truncated
utilitarian social welfare functions, defined as the average of the J lowest utilities, J being
the cutoff index. (Later on we shall work with the relative index ν = J/I , to be called
inclusion share.) Note that, in the presentmodel, these indirect utilities are increasing linear
functions of the wage rates.10 If we index the latter as w1 < w2 < · · · < wI−1 < wI ,
then u∗1 < u
∗
2 < · · · < u∗I−1 < u∗I . Hence the definition of the J-truncated social welfare
function is simple:11
UJ =
1
J
J∑
i=1
u∗i , J = 1, 2, . . . , I.
The higher the cutoff index J , the more indifferent the social planner to the utility diffe-
rences. We display the two limit cases.
The purely utilitarian case:
UI =
1
I
I∑
i=1
u∗i .
10 In the Appendix it is shown that u∗i = αλ
2wi +B, where B is a constant.
11 For practical reasons, the untruncated UI is also included.
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The Rawlsian case:
U1 = u
∗
1.
Note that the social welfare functions U1, . . . , UI−1 fail to depend on all the utilities
but they are simple and approximate well the much more complex CRRA social welfare
functions, therefore we rely on them.
Before announcing our main theorem, as a counterpart to UJ , we shall define the average
wage rate of the J lowest types (for short, J-minimum average wage rate):
WJ =
1
J
J∑
i=1
wi, j = 1, 2, . . . , I.
Because wis are increasing, so doWJs:
w1 = W1 < W2 < · · · < WI−1 < WI = W = 1.
Here is our major result.
Theorem 2. a) Let us choose a cutoff index J < I . Then for the J-truncated social
welfare function, the J-optimal tax rate is equal to
τJ(µ) =
2−WJ − 1/(1− µ−1/2)
2(1− µ−1)−WJ > 0;
provided the tax morale is higher than the J-critical value:12
µ > µJ =
2−WJ
2(1−WJ) ≥ 1.
b) The tax rate–tax morale function τJ(µ) is increasing in the tax morale µ if the
J-average wage rate is sufficiently high, namely
WJ > 4− 2
√
3 ≈ 0.54.
Remarks. 1. Under the assumptions of Theorem 2, the upper limit of the tax rate is
achieved in the white economy (µ =∞):
τJ(∞) = 1−WJ2−WJ ≤
1
2
.
2. To see the importance of our lower limit onWJ , let us consider the Rawlsian optimal
tax rate and assume that the worst-paid workers earn zero: w1 = 0.13 Then the Rawlsian
tax rate is
τ1(µ) =
1
2− µ−1
12 Note that, for inclusive social welfare function, when J = I , the I-critical tax morale is infinite!
13 This is a rather good approximation to very low wage rates.
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which is clearly a diminishing rather than increasing function of the tax morale. In this
somewhat paradoxical case, the negative impact of the tax morale on labor supply domi-
nates its positive impact on the reported wage, making the optimal tax rate diminishing.
3. The literature has concentrated on the dependence of the tax rate on the labor disutility.
In a surprising way, here the optimal tax rate is independent of α.
If we give up the uniformity of the tax morales and of the labor disutilities, then the
ordering of the indirect utilities becomes cumbersome.
We turn now to the dependence of the optimal tax rate on the cutoff index J , measuring
the extent of exclusion of the richer groups. Intuitively, we expect that the lower the cutoff
index, i.e. the more progressive is the social welfare function, the higher is the optimal tax
rate. Indeed, this is the case.
Theorem 3. LetK be a nonnegative integer such that the tax morale µ lies between µK
and µK+1 (with µ0 = 1). Then the socially optimal positive tax rates are decreasing in
the cutoff index J: τ1 > τ2 > · · · > τK > τK+1 = · · · = τI = 0.
As is usual in welfare economics, for any J , it is worth calculating the degree of the
suboptimality of the presumed tax morale-specific optimum τJ [µˆ] in an economy with
a true tax morale µ: µˆ 6= µ. Fixing the proportions of pre-tax wage rates, we look for
that average wage rate θJ , for which τJ [µ, µˆ] yields the same welfare as the original unit
average wage rate and τJ(µ) do. It is obvious that θJ is optimal for µˆ = µ.
At this point, we make a short detour into the realm of political economy. Let M be
a positive integer. Assuming that I = 2M − 1, denote the median wage rate by wM < 1.
Then every worker’s indirect utility satisfies the single-peaked condition and the optimal
tax rate corresponds to that of Theorem 2, only theM -minimal average wage rateWM is
replaced by the median one wM , and the critical tax morale µM with its counterpart µ∗.
We have
Theorem 2.* a) Assume that the tax morale is higher than the critical value µ∗:
µ > µ∗ =
2− wM
2(1− wM ) ≥ 1.
Then the median voter’s preferred tax rate is positive and is given by
τ∗(µ) =
2− wM − 1/(1− µ−1/2)
2(1− µ−1)− wM
b) If 4− 2√3 < wM (< 1), then the median voter’s tax rate is an increasing function
of the tax morale.
Remarks. 1. In accordance with Meltzer and Richard (1981), in our model the greater
the pre-tax earning inequality, here measured by the difference between the average and
the median wage rates 1 − wM , the greater redistribution will be chosen by the median
voter.
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2. Since theM -minimal average wage rate is generally lower than the median wage rate:
WM < wM , therefore 0 < τ∗(µ) < τM (µ), i.e. the M -optimum tax rate is higher than
the median voter’s. Also, the bounds mean much stronger restrictions in the political
economy model than in the welfare maximization model. If the cutoff index J is high, so
WJ ≈ wM , then the J-optimal solution is close to the median voter’s one.
III. Numerical illustrations
To give a sense of the magnitudes, we rely on numerical illustrations. We shall work with
extremely simple specifications, for example, α = 1.
First, we illustrate the traditional view formulated in Theorem 1. We choose the basic
income as one tenth of the average wage rate, i.e. β∗ = 0.1 and run the tax morale µ from
4 to 12 to∞. Then the balancing tax rate drops from 0.27 to 0.22 and then to 0.19.
Table 2: The impact of tax morale on balancing tax rate
Tax morale Balancing tax rate
µ τ0.1[µ]
4 0.267
6 0.240
8 0.229
10 0.222
12 0.218
. . . . . .
∞ 0.192
Remark. β∗ = 0.1.
However, our government maximizes its social welfare function rather than fixes the basic
income.We shall use an arbitrary but realistic wage rate distribution with quintiles (I = 5),
and normalize its expected value to 1 (see the first column of Table 3 below). Since the
J-minimum average wage rates WJ are also important, we display them in the second
column. To make our presentation less dependent on the number of types, we shall work
with the relative share of preferred workers in the population, namely the inclusion share:
ν = J/I rather than their absolute numbers or the cutoff index J . We start the illustrations
with index J = 3 or rather with the inclusion share ν = 0.6.
First we display a simple run with tax morale µ = 4, i.e. workers undeclare 1/4 of their
wages, with the optimal tax rate being equal to 0.267. Table 3 produces sensible results and
presumably can be used for further calculations. The redistribution is quite spectacular:
the signed net transfers paid by the workers being equal to T ∗i = τ(wil
∗
i − e∗i )− β∗, the
poorest quintile receives 23% of its potential earnings and the richest quintile pays about
8% of its potential earnings.
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Table 3: The individual optimal outcomes for 3-quintile optimum
Wage J-minimal Undeclared Transfer
rate wage rate earning paid Consumption
wi WJ e
∗
i T
∗
i c
∗
i
0.4 0.4 0.077 −0.091 0.399
0.6 0.5 0.115 −0.061 0.522
0.8 0.6 0.154 −0.030 0.646
1.2 0.75 0.231 0.030 0.893
2.0 1 0.385 0.152 1.386
Remarks. ν = 0.6, µ = 4, τ0.6 = 0.264, L∗ = 0.769. We use notation τν rather than τν ,
to distinguish the utilitarian optimum τ1 from the Rawlsian optimum τ1.
Next, we move on to studying the impact of tax morale on optimal average outcomes,
and usually drop the adjective average. In Table 4, the tax morale runs from 2 to 5 to
infinity (white economy) and see the quantitative side of Theorem 2: the optimal tax rate
rises from 0.121 to 0.273 to 0.286. Note that the correspondingW3 > 0.54, guaranteeing
monotonicity. At the same time, the optimal basic income is an increasing function of the
taxmorale: it runs from 0.055 to 0.165 to 0.204 in terms of the potential averagewage. (The
low optimal value of basic income precludes the existence of balancing tax rate for µ = 2
and β = 0.1 in Table 2.) Note that, even in the white economy, the lowest consumption is
way below the average: 0.408 < 0.71. It is quite disturbing that the poorest’s welfare is
only increasing because the lost labor supply is made up by redistribution.
At this point, we want to obtain an estimation of the welfare loss due to using the tax
morale coefficient µˆ = ∞ rather than the true one. The last column of Table 4 displays
the value of the scalar θ by which multiplying wage rates wi of the appropriately taxed
economy, the resulting J-welfare becomes equal to that of the falsely taxed economy. For
example, in an economy with true tax morale 4 (italicized row), the idealistically chosen
τˆ = 0.286 leads to θ = 0.923, i.e. a relative loss about 8% with respect to the realistic
optimum τ(µ) = 0.264.
Table 4: The impact of tax morale on optimal outcomes for 3-quintiles
Tax Optimal Aggregate Basic Lowest Inefficiency
morale tax rate labor income consumption due to error
µ τ0.6(µ) λ(µ) β0.6(µ) c1 θ0.6(µ,∞)
2 0.121 0.909 0.055 0.397 0.848
3 0.240 0.800 0.128 0.397 0.896
4 0.264 0.769 0.152 0.399 0.923
5 0.273 0.755 0.165 0.401 0.939
· · · · · ·
∞ 0.286 0.714 0.204 0.408 1
Remark. ν = 0.6.
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Including only the single poorest quintile rather than the three poorest quintiles, the impact
of the tax morale on the socially optimal tax rate ceases to be monotone, moreover, the
tax rate remains uniformly high but stagnating around 0.38. Note that the corresponding
W1 < 0.54, leaving room for decreasing tax rate for µ > 3.33. The negative impact of tax
morale on labor supply dominates the scene: the labor supply drops from 0.714 with µ = 2
to 0.625 in the white economy. Therefore the increasing redistribution via the increasing
basic income is counterbalanced by the dropping labor supply, thus the poorest quintile’s
consumption remains lower than in the less Rawlsian redistribution.
Table 5: The impact of tax morale on optimal outcomes for 1-quintile
Tax Optimal Aggregate Basic Lowest
morale tax rate labor income consumption
µ τ0.2(µ) λ(µ) β0.2(µ) c1
2 0.381 0.714 0.136 0.367
3 0.400 0.667 0.178 0.373
4 0.398 0.652 0.194 0.378
5 0.394 0.645 0.203 0.380
· · · · · ·
∞ 0.375 0.625 0.234 0.391
As a detour, we illustrate the political economy equilibrium. To distinguish the third quin-
tile from the three lowest quintiles, we shall use subindex [0.5] rather than superscript 0.6.
For any tax morale, the political economy equilibrium is much lower than the 3-quintile
optimum, it remains zero for µ = 2, 3 and only rises from 0.07 for µ = 4 to 0.167 in the
white economy. Correspondingly, the redistribution is also lower, but the average labor
supply is higher than in the welfare model.
Table 6: The impact of tax morale in political economy
Tax Optimal Aggregate Basic Median
morale tax rate labor income consumption
µ τ[0.5][µ] λ[µ] β[0.5][µ] cM
3 0 1 0 0.800
4 0.071 0.938 0.050 0.760
5 0.101 0.909 0.073 0.742
10 0.142 0.865 0.110 0.714
· · · · · ·
∞ 0.167 0.833 0.139 0.694
Finally, to explain the anomaly found byAlesina andAngelitos (2005)with our framework,
we display two countries with two inclusion shares: νL = 0.2 (low) and νH = 0.6 (high)
and two pre-tax wage rate inequality setups. For the sake of simplicity, we keep the original
wage rates of Table 3 for the high-inequality set up, and create a low-inequality set up
by scaling down the deviations from the mean: wi(ω) = 1 + ω(wi − 1) with ω = 0.8.
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Since the (dis)utility parameters are uniform, the pre- and post-tax indicators are the same.
Comparing the economies represented by rows 2 and 3 of Table 7, higher inclusion share
0.6 (vs. 0.2) overrules the impact of higher earning inequality and leads to a lower optimal
tax rate 0.26 (vs. 0.32).
Table 7: Lower inclusion share may overrule lower earning inequality
Earning Inclusion Optimal Basic
inequality share tax rate income
ω ν τν(4) βν(4)
1 0.2 0.398 0.194
1 0.6 0.264 0.152
0.8 0.2 0.323 0.174
0.8 0.6 0.196 0.122
Remark. µ = 4.
We could continue the numerical exploration without any difficulty but, for our purposes,
this seems to be sufficient to show the basic idea of the model: in addition to the much
studied elasticity of labor supply and inclusion share (or the indifference index), the tax
morale also plays an important role in the choice of optimal income taxation. This ob-
servation is also supported by my previous paper (Simonovits, 2010), where a distinctly
different specification of the problem (with logarithmic utility functions, fixed labor sup-
ply and purely utilitarian social welfare function) gave qualitatively similar results.
IV. Conclusion
In this very simple toy model, we were able to study the impact of the exogenous tax mo-
rale on the socially optimal tax rate. Under certain assumptions (uniform linear-quadratic
utilities), first we demonstrated with pencil and paper the traditional view: for a given tax
revenue, the higher the tax morale, the lower the balancing tax rate (Theorem 1). Further-
more, adding truncated (or exclusive) social welfare functions, we proved analytically
Theorems 2 and 3: higher morale and lower inclusion share imply higher socially optimal
tax rate, provided that the included average wage is higher than 0.54 times the average.
We can add a third observation: higher earning inequality implies a higher optimal tax
rate, but this can be reversed by a higher inclusion share. Incidentally, political economy
considerations generates similar results: a higher tax morale implies a higher equilibrium
tax rate (Theorem 2*). Further work should be done to check the robustness of our re-
sults, i.e. extend Theorems 2 and 3 to other utility functions, social welfare functions
and heterogeneous tax morales. More importantly, the exogenous tax morales and simple
labor disutility functions should be replaced by endogenous tax morales and sophisticated
labor disutilities implying realistic labor supplies. The provision of public goods and its
efficiency also require attention.
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Appendix: Proofs
Balancing tax rate
The definition of the basic income β∗ yields an implicit function:
F (µ) = δ(µ)τ2 − τ + αβ
∗
1− µ−1 = 0.
Using the formula for the solution of the quadratic equation yields τβ∗ [µ] in Theorem 1.
Elementary reasoning establishes that τβ∗ [µ] is a decreasing function.
Optimal labor supply and unreported wage
Take the partial derivatives with respect to li and ei, then make them to zero:
0 = v′i,l(li, ei) = 2wi(1− τ)− 2αwili + µτw−1i l−2i e2i
and
0 = v′i,e(li, ei) = 2τ − 2µτw−1i l−1i ei.
Rearranging the second equation we obtain eˆi = µ−1wili, for µ > 1.
Although the first equation appears to be cubic in li, after substitution of eˆi it also becomes
linear:
0 = v′i,l(li, eˆi) = 2wi(1− τ)− 2αwili + µτw−1i l−2i µ−2w2i l2i .
After rearrangement: 0 = 2(1− τ)− 2αli + τµ−1 and recalling notations
λ = λ(µ, τ) = α−1(1− δτ) and δ = 1− 1
2µ
,
the optimal labor supply and unreported wage are respectively
l∗i = λ and e
∗
i = µ
−1wiλ.
To have a true maximum, we must check concavity in the domain. We need the four
second-order derivatives:
v′′i,ll(li, ei) = −2αwi−2µτw−1i l−3i e2i < 0, v′′i,le(li, ei) = vi,el(li, ei) = 2µτw−1i l−2i ei
112 Andra´s Simonovits: Does Higher Tax Morale Imply
Higher Optimal Labor Income Tax Rate?
and
v′′i,ee(li, ei) = −2µτw−1i l−1i < 0.
The negativity conditions hold, and the determinant condition
∆ = v′′i,ll(li, ei)v
′′
i,ee(li, ei)− v′′i,le(li, ei)2 > 0
also holds:
1
4
∆ = (αwi + µτw
−1
i l
−3
i e
2
i )µτw
−1
i l
−1
i − (µτw−1i l−2i ei)2 = αwiµτw−1i l−1i > 0.
For α ≥ 1 and 0 < τ < 1, 0 < l∗i < 1.
Optimal tax rate
Inserting β∗ into the indirect utility functions,
u∗i = vi(l
∗
i , e
∗
i ) = 2λwi(1− τ) + 2µ−1wiλτ + 2τ(1− µ−1)λ− αwiλ2 − µ−1τwiλ.
To have compact formulas
u∗i = A(µ, τ)wi +B(µ, τ) and U
∗
J (µ, τ) = A(µ, τ)WJ +B(µ, τ),
we substitute δ and λ:
A(µ, τ) = 2λ(1−τ)+µ−1λτ−αλ2 = αλ2 and B(µ, τ) = 2τ(1−µ−1)λ = 2(2δ−1)τλ.
The socially optimal tax rate is given by the first-order necessary condition:
U∗J,τ
′(µ, τ) = A′τ (µ, τ)WJ +B
′
τ (µ, τ) = 0.
Executing the calculations:
0 = −δWJ + δ2WJτ + 2δ − 1− 2(2δ − 1)δτ
yields the socially J-optimal tax rate:
τJ(µ) =
2− 1/δ −WJ
2(2δ − 1)− δWJ .
To have a positive tax rate, we must have 1− µ−1/2 = δ > 1/(2−WJ), i.e.
µ > µJ =
1
2[1− 1/(2−WJ)] =
2−WJ
2(1−WJ) .
To have an increasing tax rate–tax morale function, τ ′J(µ) > 0 must hold. Replacing µ by
δ, introducing z = 2−WJ and dropping the square of the denominator, we have
0 < τ ′J [δ] ≈ z(4δ2 − zδ)− (zδ − 1)8δ.
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Rearranging this inequality results in
1
2
< δ < δ¯ =
8− z2
4z
=
4 + 4WJ −W 2J
4(2−WJ) .
Since δ(µ)’s range is [1/2, 1], a simple calculation shows thatWJ = 4− 2
√
3 pushes δ¯ to
1, implying τ ′J(µ) > 0 for any µ. ForWJ < 4− 2
√
3 and µ > µc, τ ′J(µ) < 0.
Finally, we show that τJ(µ) is a decreasing function ofWJ . Taking its partial derivative
with respect toWJ and dropping the denominator:
−[2(2δ − 1−WJ ] + 2−WJ − δ−1 = −4δ + 4− δ−1 = −(2δ − 1)2δ−1 < 0.
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